

PRINCIPLES OF FAILURE: MAO TSE-TUNG'S INSIGHTS ON PLANNING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Daniel P. Mahoney III
Infantry**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Major Daniel P. Mahoney III

Title of Monograph: *Principles of Failure: Mao Tse-Tung's Insights on Planning Military Interventions*

Approved by:

Albert Bryant Jr
COL Albert Bryant, MA, MMAS

Monograph Director

Danny M. Davis
COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies

Philip J. Brookes
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate
Degree Program

Accepted this 22d Day of May 1997

ABSTRACT

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Mao Tse-Tung noted that the Japanese committed five major operational level mistakes during their intervention into China in 1937. He claimed that these mistakes were so severe that they would ultimately cause Japan to fail to achieve its aims. The Japanese did fail, and this monograph assumes that Mao's five mistakes were the proximate cause of that failure. The apparent success of Mao's prediction raises a question regarding his five observations: are they unique to the Sino-Japanese conflict, or do they have more general applicability. This monograph examines Mao's five mistakes to see if they can provide general insights for US planners of military interventions.

The paper begins by exploring the background and execution of the Japanese intervention into China in 1937. It then continues with a discussion of Mao's five Japanese mistakes. The paper next considers two other military interventions, the German intervention into Yugoslavia in 1941 and the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan in 1979. As with the Japanese intervention, the discussion covers the background and execution of both campaigns followed by an analysis of the events in terms of Mao's five mistakes. The paper concludes by suggesting guidance for US planners of future military interventions based on the analysis.

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I. Introduction

The National Command Authority (NCA) has called on the US Army to conduct low-intensity military operations frequently over the last twenty years. Given the current National Strategy stressing engagement and the world's volatile post cold war environment, one can expect this trend to continue. It therefore makes sense to examine the experience of other armies that have had to intervene in this way to learn from their experiences. It is particularly instructive to explore these experiences from the native or insurgent force's perspective to help "[k]now your enemy..." as Sun Tzu warned.¹ One such valuable foreign example occurred in China in 1937 where the Japanese Imperial Army learned a lesson regarding Sun Tzu's maxim.

On September 23, 1937, the Japanese 5th Division received orders to continue offensive operations westward into Inner Mongolia to secure the province of Shansi. Once secured, Shansi would become part of the buffer zone the Japanese wanted to create between Manchukuo (Manchuria) and China. The 5th Division crossed into Shansi on the 25th, and immediately made contact with Chinese provincial troops. One of the 5th Division's brigades pursued the Chinese to the south after a sharp fire fight. The division's other brigade, the 21st, continued west toward the town of Pinghsingkuan.²

The route to Pinghsingkuan was a sunken road that snaked through Shansi's northern mountains. Centuries of wagon wheels and strong winds had turned the road into a deep trench with few exits.³ Most military units would blanch at the prospect of using such a constrictive route, but not the 21st Brigade. The 21st not only used the sunken road, they did not even bother to post security elements on their flanks. Why should they? The Nationalist Chinese forces in that region had retreated more than sixty

miles to the west the day before which left the 21st far behind the front lines. The 21st had little to worry about; or so they thought.

The leaders of the 21st probably realized their mistake when grenades and machine gun fire started cascading down on them. In less than two hours the brigade lay shattered, its soldiers dead and equipment captured. The unit that taught the 21st Brigade its bitter lesson was the 115th Division of the Communist 8th Route Army.⁴ Years of guerrilla warfare against the Chinese Nationalists had taught the communists much about fighting on a fluid battlefield. They made little distinction between front lines and rear areas. To them, the front was wherever the enemy was weakest, and at that moment the Japanese were weakest on a sunken road in Shansi. Of all the lessons the Japanese learned that day, the most important dealt with the nature of the war they faced in China. Rather than the decisive, positional war the Japanese desired, it would be a drawn out affair with non-linear battlefields and unconventional action.

Except for a few isolated incidents like the Pinghsingkuan victory, the Sino-Japanese war began disastrously for the Chinese. It was so bad that by the end of the war's first year many Chinese felt that ultimate Japanese victory was inevitable.⁵ One person who voiced a completely different opinion was Mao Tse-Tung. Mao expressed his views in a series of lectures regarding the way that the Chinese should conduct the war. The tenor of Mao's lectures was surprisingly optimistic given the war situation at the time. He believed that China would win the war, but only after a long, hard struggle.

Mao's lectures covered a variety of topics, but one in particular offered immediate military benefit. This was a set of observations regarding strategic and operational errors made by the Japanese. Mao identified five critical mistakes that the Japanese made during

the initial stage of their military intervention into China, and presented them as real vulnerabilities that the Chinese could exploit.⁶ Mao's observations regarding the Japanese army's five critical mistakes form the basis for this paper.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Mao's set of Japanese mistakes to see if they offer useful insights for US planners. The Japanese invasion of China was a military intervention by an advanced, mechanized force into a politically divided country. Japan's political aim was to establish a stable and politically favorable autonomous state as a buffer zone between its Manchukuo holdings and China, and then remove its forces for use elsewhere. Likewise, the US has demonstrated its willingness to intervene militarily in politically torn foreign countries. In Panama, Kuwait, Haiti, and Bosnia the US used its military to alter an unstable, unfriendly or repressive internal environment. It is possible that Mao's five mistakes are relevant only to the Japanese failure to quickly pacify China in 1937. If that is true they are of little value. If, however, they have more general applicability, they could form the basis of guidance for modern planners. This paper takes the position that US planners can learn from Mao's observations.

This paper takes a cue from Mao and concentrates on the military aspects of such an intervention. The paper begins by exploring the background and execution of the Japanese intervention into China in 1937. It then continues with a discussion of Mao's five Japanese mistakes. The paper next considers two other military interventions, the German intervention into Yugoslavia in 1941 and the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan in 1979. As with the Japanese intervention, the discussion covers the background and execution of both campaigns followed by an analysis of the events in terms of Mao's five mistakes. The paper concludes by suggesting guidance for US planners of future military

interventions based on the analysis.

The first step in any analysis is to gather facts. In this case the critical facts involve the nature of the Sino-Japanese War, and the mistakes made by the Japanese army. With this purpose in mind, the paper turns to China in the summer of 1937.

II. The Five Mistakes

Strategic Background

The entry of the Western powers into Asian affairs forever altered the power structure of the Far East.⁷ The source of early European influence was the opium trade. When the Chinese government tried to cut off the flow of opium, the British invaded. The British quickly defeated the Chinese and forced them to grant open access to their markets. The growing Western influence in China caused a corresponding weakening of Chinese sovereignty. Always wary of Westerners, the Japanese watched the European subjugation of China with alarm. Japanese concern over Western Imperialism peaked after the Second Opium War. The armistice treaty granted the Western powers wide control over ports and commerce in China. Determined not to share China's fate, the Japanese launched an intense effort of modernization and militarization to halt Western expansion in the East.⁸

While generally hostile to Europeans, there was one thing that the Japanese appreciated about them. The Europeans, with their vast merchant fleets, could provide the Japanese with the materials they lacked. Using these resources, the Japanese rapidly transformed themselves from a feudal, agrarian country into an emerging industrial power. The first major benefit of the Japanese transformation was their victory in the Russo-

Japanese War. That victory did three important things. First, it established the Japanese as a legitimate player in world politics. Next, it confirmed Japan's place as a major regional power in the Far East. Finally, the Japanese victory gave them control of Manchuria. They thus gained a toehold for their ambitions on the Asian mainland.⁹

The Japanese used their new power to increase their influence in China. Driven by national pride, overpopulation and greed, the Japanese worked aggressively to expand their mainland holdings.¹⁰ The outbreak of the First World War forced the Western powers to recall most of their military might from China. The Japanese exploited the resulting power vacuum by expanding their control of Manchuria and acquiring ports in China proper.¹¹ When the war in Europe ended, the Western powers turned their attention back to China. The scope of the Japanese advances alarmed the West, but five years of war had left the Europeans too exhausted to do much about it. The result was a series of agreements that traded Western acceptance of the *status quo* in China for a Japanese pledge to restrict its future expansion and military buildup.¹² With these agreements in hand, Japan was on the path to regional hegemony in the Far East. That is until an unexpected development, the resurgence of Chinese nationalism, complicated the issue.

The Chinese nationalism movement was a reaction to the political chaos in China following the fall of the last Manchu emperor in 1912. This fall marked the end of centralized government in China. Control passed to regional Warlords who ruled the provinces as autonomous states. This anarchy lead to the creation of competing political groups determined to take control of China. The two most powerful groups to emerge during this period were the Nationalists and the Communists.¹³

In 1926, the Nationalists under Chaing Kai-shek launched a campaign to depose the Warlords and unify China. They were largely successful and by 1927 the Nationalists had established themselves as the recognized central government of China. Once in power the Nationalists focused their efforts on destroying their Communist rivals. After a series of disastrous campaigns, Chaing finally managed to drive the Communists out of their south China strongholds. The Communists fled north in their famous “Long March.” It is ironic that Chaing’s victory forced the Communists to go where they would win so much glory during the coming Sino-Japanese war.

One critical aspect of the Communists’ participation in the Sino-Japanese war was their fighting strategy. Ten years of fighting outnumbered and outgunned against their Nationalist rivals had made Mao and his followers experts in unconventional warfare. Mao’s methods emphasized mobility, raids, swift concentrations and rapid dispersal. A lifetime of fighting superior foes persuaded Mao to reject the primacy of terrain-oriented positional warfare strategy. He instead adopted force-oriented strategies based on mobile and guerrilla warfare. Mao believed that the way to beat a superior foe was to avoid decisive battle and break his morale over time. Mao’s expertise in operating on a fluid battlefield would play an important role in the coming fight with the Japanese.¹⁴

Campaign Summary

In the early 1930’s, Japan adopted a national strategy designed to make it a first tier world power with complete hegemony over Asia. The strategy had five goals: expulsion of the white races from the Far East; Philippine independence; expansion into the Netherlands East Indies; control over development of the region’s underdeveloped nations; and growth in Manchukuo coupled with close economic ties to China.¹⁵ It was

that last goal that eventually drew Japan into conflict with China.

The rising tide of Chinese Nationalism threatened Japan's hold on Manchukuo. Japanese concern for stability in Manchukuo compelled them to seek a buffer between Manchukuo and China.¹⁶ The Japanese strategy to create a buffer involved a gradual encroachment into the northern provinces of Hopei and Chahar. The Japanese conducted such encroachment by staging the deaths of Japanese nationals, and then demanding concessions (troop garrisons, police control, etc.) in the name of Japanese security. Chaing's policy throughout the 1930's was to appease the Japanese so that he could concentrate on the Communists. The Japanese planned to eventually usurp complete control over the northern provinces while Chaing focused on the Communists. This strategy worked until a group of Chaing's subordinates changed his priorities.

In December of 1936, one of Chaing's generals in the North refused an order to join an anti-Communist campaign. He decided, instead, to deploy against further Japanese incursions. Chaing moved north with an army to bring the rebellious officer to heel. Once in the North, the rebels kidnapped Chaing. They refused to release him until he agreed to join with the Communists and form a united front against the Japanese.¹⁷ Chaing reluctantly agreed. In so doing, he set the stage for the final act in the road to war.

The Nationalist-Communist accord convinced the Japanese that their encroachment strategy was no longer viable. Thus, they developed a new strategy to secure their buffer. This new plan called for a limited military action designed to force the northern provincial leaders into Japanese control. Since Chaing had not conquered the five northern warlords in 1927, the northern provinces remained semi-autonomous. The Japanese determined that if they could seize Peking and the critical rail and road networks

to the south, they could isolate the northern provinces. Thus, cut off from external support the Japanese could bully the warlords into submission. They discounted the Chinese government's reaction because the Japanese had been acting with impunity for years. The Japanese tried to implement their strategy in July 1937 with a staged murder of a Japanese soldier. The Japanese demanded that the Chinese turn over their local army commander for trial, but the Chinese refused. The Japanese responded by seizing the rail and road networks near Lukouchiao. To their complete surprise, the Chinese resisted fiercely and drove the Japanese back. Unwilling to accept the loss of face associated with defeat at the hands of the "inferior" Chinese, the Japanese again changed strategy. They decided their next move should be an attack out of Manchukuo in force.¹⁸

The Japanese intended their Chinese campaign to be a Clausewitzian "war of limited aims."¹⁹ Their war aim was to create a stable, pro-Japanese, autonomous region in northern China to act as a buffer for Manchukuo. The Japanese strategic plan called for seizing Peking and territory along the Manchukuo border in a quick, decisive campaign followed by a negotiated settlement with the Chinese government.²⁰ Once the buffer was in place, the Japanese would establish a few small garrisons and withdraw the bulk of their forces. They believed the Chinese could not bear the loss of Peking. They were wrong.

The initial Japanese offensive went well. Within two weeks they had defeated a Chinese Army and captured Peking.²¹ They then went on to capture all the critical transportation nodes south of Peking. In spite of their repeated losses, the Chinese did not sue for peace. Frustrated and enraged, the Japanese again changed strategy.

The Japanese remained convinced that they could achieve their aim through a negotiated settlement. They determined that if they could seize Nanking, the capital of

China, Chaing would have to negotiate. Thus in August, the Japanese sent an expeditionary force south to seize Shanghai and Nanking. Chaing decided to use this action to enlist the world's support. Even though the Japanese had an overwhelming firepower advantage, Chaing condemned his best forces to a hopeless battle before Nanking. Nanking finally fell after four months of brutal fighting, but the Chinese did not come to the table. The infamous Rape of Nanking was the result of Japanese frustration over failing to force the Chinese to the bargaining table.²² The war would continue.

By the early fall, the Japanese began to doubt their ability to force a negotiated settlement. They therefore modified their strategy to include a new northern campaign. The plan called for a three-pronged offensive along the rail lines running south from Peking to isolate the region north of the Yellow River(Map 1 at appendix A).²³ The Japanese felt that thus isolated the northern warlords must lose the will to continue resisting. The Chinese tried to stop the Japanese with a defensive campaign of positional warfare, but failed disastrously. The Chinese Army was simply no match for the Japanese in conventional warfare. The Chinese did manage a few tactical victories (i.e., Pinghsingkuan), but only when they abandoned positional warfare and adopted mobile warfare techniques. Such success was rare. By the end of the first year, the Japanese had achieved all of their operational objectives. They did not, however, achieve their stated aim of creating a stable, pro-Japanese region.

Mao on the Japanese in China

The virtually unbroken string of Japanese operational and tactical victories caused widespread pessimism in China. Many felt that complete strategic defeat was only a matter of time. This opinion, however, overlooked an important set of Chinese successes.

Since September 1937, Mao and his communists had been waging an insurgency inside Japanese occupied China. This insurgency featured an extensive guerrilla campaign against the Japanese lines of communications (LOC) coupled with occasional episodes of mobile warfare. It was this insurgency that prevented the Japanese from realizing their ultimate war aim. Those Chinese who recognized the insurgency's long-term potential tended to be more optimistic. One of these optimists was Mao Tse-Tung. Mao had seen something amiss in the Japanese efforts to deal with his insurgency; something that he felt he could capitalize on in the future to achieve ultimate victory.

What Mao observed was a series of recurring Japanese mistakes at the operational level.²⁴ Mao believed that five of these mistakes were critical enough to jeopardize the Japanese war aim. The five critical mistakes were: piecemeal reinforcement; absence of a main direction of attack; lack of operational coordination; failure to grasp operational opportunities; and encirclement of large, but annihilation of small numbers.²⁵ If these five mistakes were instrumental in Japan's failure to break Mao's insurgency, they could offer powerful insights for planners of future counter-insurgency operations. As the source of such potentially valuable information, Mao's thoughts deserve closer scrutiny.

Piecemeal Reinforcement

Mao identified the first Japanese failure as Japan's piecemeal commitment of forces into China. One need only trace the Japanese troop level in China through the war's first year to see Mao's point. When the Japanese invaded Japan in response to the Lukouchiao incident, they did so with just over two divisions.²⁶ By the time the Japanese finished the Shanghai-Nanking campaign in December 1937, they had over 15 divisions in China.²⁷ By the end of the war's first year, the Japanese had over 30 divisions in

theater.²⁸ Mao claimed that the Japanese made this mistake for two reasons. The first was a chronic shortage of soldiers available to cover their huge empire. The second was the seemingly congenital Japanese tendency to underestimate the Chinese due to racial prejudices.²⁹ Influenced by these limitations, the Japanese repeatedly committed forces into battle that were too weak to achieve decisive results.

Most students of war will recognize a close parallel between Mao's first mistake and Clausewitz's idea of concentration in space. Clausewitz claimed that "(t)he best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point."³⁰ Thus Mao is in good company in taking exception with the Japanese tendency to apply force so parsimoniously.

The problem with this piecemealing is that it played directly into Mao's war strategy. A key component of his strategy was to "...break the morale and combat effectiveness..." of the Japanese through a long campaign of attrition.³¹ Committing understrength units increased Japanese losses and prevented the war's rapid conclusion. These two factors in turn contributed to the gradual Japanese morale breakdown. The Japanese compounded the effects of piecemealing their forces into operations by failing to focus the efforts of those forces they did employ.

Absence of a Main Direction of Attack

Mao's second criticism of the Japanese concerned their failure to establish a main direction of attack. Specifically, Mao was critical of the way that the Japanese distributed their forces throughout China in multiple simultaneous campaigns.³² He felt that the Japanese could not be successful unless they focused their combat power on a single operational objective.

Mao had long preached the need to focus one's combat power. In his early writings during the struggle against the Nationalists he had written, "...we must...(o)ppose the strategy of striking with two fists in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one fist in one direction at a time."³³ Clausewitz again supports Mao with the idea that there is a "...point against which all our energies should be directed."³⁴ Clausewitz called this point the center of gravity (COG) and defined it as "...the hub of all power and movement."³⁵ The Japanese failure to focus stemmed from the fact that they incorrectly identified the Chinese COG.

The Japanese believed that the will of the northern warlords was the Chinese COG.³⁶ They then concluded that the rail network over which the warlord's war material flowed was that COG's critical vulnerability.³⁷ The Japanese therefore directed all their energy toward controlling the far-flung network.³⁸ This led the Japanese to try to be everywhere and do everything at once, distributing their army in a set of autonomous operations throughout northeastern China. The real problem was that this disposition prevented the Japanese from focusing their efforts against the real threat. China's true COG was the will of its people, particularly that will's manifestation as Mao's mass peasant army. Until the Japanese recognized that fact and concentrated their efforts against the peasant insurgency, they could not achieve their ultimate aim. The Japanese failure to identify the true Chinese COG was also instrumental in the their failure to synchronize their actions at the operational level.

Lack of Operational Coordination

Clausewitz described concentration in time when he wrote that, "all forces intended and available for a strategic purpose should be applied simultaneously; their

employment will be the more effective the more everything can be concentrated [in] a single action at a single moment.”³⁹ Mao’s third observation represents a failure to concentrate in time. Mao used the battle of Taierhchuang to illustrate the Japanese failure to coordinate their operational efforts.

By the Spring of 1938, the Japanese were within reach of isolating northeastern China. Units from the northern campaign had finally made it to the Yellow River, and the Shanghai campaign’s forces had crossed the Yangtze from the South. All that remained to complete the eastern cordon was to eliminate the large Chinese conventional army positioned between the two rivers. Unfortunately for the Japanese, there was no overall theater commander coordinating the two campaigns. The northern forces, from the Manchukuo garrison, were completely independent of the Shanghai expeditionary forces that had come from Japan. The northern forces moved more quickly and made contact with the Chinese first near the fortified town of Taierchuang. The Chinese were in superbly prepared defensive positions and fought with a ferocity that stunned the Japanese. Although they were close enough, the southern forces failed to move against the Chinese rear in a coordinated attack. By the time they finally did move north it was too late. The Chinese had surrounded one northern division and destroyed it in detail. The belated attack from the South only added to the debacle as the Chinese encircled and destroyed it in turn. The Japanese failure to act in concert cost them 15,000 lives.⁴⁰

Mao focused his writings on the Japanese failure to coordinate militarily throughout the theater. A more critical problem, however, was the Japanese failure to coordinate their military operations with efforts to deal with the civilian population of northeastern China. Failure to recognize the population as the true COG, intense ethnic

disdain and a fixation on conventional forces drove the Japanese to neglect the Chinese masses--the key to their desired aim. The Japanese failed to recognize that although they controlled the LOCs and urban centers, they could never consolidate their gains unless they controlled the people as well.

Failure to Grasp Operational Opportunities

Mao's first three observations involved Japanese mistakes of commission. The fourth mistake on Mao's list, on the other hand, is a mistake of omission. Mao's criticism of the Japanese on this point is straightforward. He felt that the Japanese passed up several opportunities to eliminate large portions of the Chinese Army.⁴¹

The record is full of examples on this point. In the first month of the war, the Japanese had the Chinese 29th Army surrounded on three sides near Peking and let them escape.⁴² Later, the Japanese failed to conduct pursuit and exploitation operations against the armies they had routed during their campaign for Nanking. Although these are examples of what Mao was writing about, they are actually tactical rather than operational failures. Mao's intuition was correct, however, because these missed tactical opportunities soon became missed operational opportunities.

One of the pillars of Mao's strategy against the Japanese Army was to organize peasants for mass guerrilla actions in the Japanese rear.⁴³ Sun Tzu wrote that "...what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."⁴⁴ Because the Japanese failed to understand the war's true nature, they passed on opportunities to destroy men who would later become the backbone of Mao's growing peasant army. Thus the missed tactical opportunities to pursue and exploit became missed operational opportunities to attack Mao's strategy. The Japanese failure to capitalize on opportunities is related to

Mao's final observation. This observation concerns the Japanese failure to plan for their desired endstate.

Encirclement of Large, but Annihilation of Small, Numbers

Mao's final point was about creating a decisive result. Clausewitz wrote that, "...of all the possible aims in war, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces always appears as the highest."⁴⁵ In an intervention where one faces multiple levels of warfare, the destruction that Clausewitz called for can take many forms. Mao specifically criticized the Japanese for their tendency to encircle large numbers of Chinese, yet kill or capture only a small number--a tactical mistake. The greater Japanese mistake was their failure to set the conditions to achieve a decision at the operational level.

The Japanese failure to take decision producing actions was linked to their mistaken identification of the Chinese COG. The Japanese focused all of their efforts on seizing the rail LOCs. When they had captured those objectives, defeating the conventional defensive forces in the process, the Japanese prematurely concluded that they had reached a decision. They soon discovered, however, that while they had sufficient troops to win in battle they did not have enough to pacify the conquered areas.⁴⁶ The Japanese could not consolidate their gains because they had never taken any steps toward dealing with their enemy's true source of strength.

Mao wrote that in a guerrilla campaign, the guerrillas are the fish and the people are the sea in which they live.⁴⁷ Thus to achieve ultimate success in a low intensity situation, one must neutralize either the fish or their sea. The Japanese did not have enough forces to destroy the fish as Clausewitz wanted. Their only choice then was to somehow "destroy" the sea. The problem was that instead of destroying the sea, the

Japanese ignored it.

The true Japanese mistake was their failure to deal with the civilian population of northeastern China. When the Japanese first entered Peking, the Chinese residents cowered in fear. The Japanese, however, proved to be rather benevolent occupiers. The fatalistic Chinese quickly learned to accept their new masters and returned to their normal lives.⁴⁸ The point is that there was an opportunity, in the very beginning, to destroy the Chinese people's will to fight by co-opting them. This Japanese never noticed the opportunity. Their racism and focus on the conventional campaign precluded the Japanese from considering the civilian population at all until they started to brutalize the civilians out of frustration. In the final analysis Mao was correct. The Japanese failure to somehow neutralize the people's will was a failure to annihilate the enemy.

Even though they enjoyed tactical success, one must judge the Japanese campaign an operational failure. Simply put, the Japanese failed to achieve their aim. Mao claimed to understand why the Japanese failed, and provided a list of the five major reasons. Even if he was correct on every point, it does not guarantee that his observations contain utility for US planners. To be useful, guidance must be robust. It must show utility across a wide variety of situations. To examine the robustness of Mao's observations, this paper will examine two other military interventions that failed to achieve their aims. It does so to see if Mao's list of mistakes contribute to failure in these very different environments. If it happens that there is a correlation, then Mao's observations may indeed contain the seeds of useful planning guidance. With this goal in mind, the paper turns to Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941.

III. German Intervention into Yugoslavia, April 1941

The German intervention into Yugoslavia is similar enough to the Japanese experience in China to make a comparison valid, yet different enough to expand this study's scope. Both events involved interventions by nations with powerful and modernized militaries into politically divided countries with weak armies. Both events also featured large-scale insurgencies that the invader could never quell. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's pre-existing internal divisions were ethnic rather than political as in China. Furthermore, these divisions had not developed into open warfare before the intervention as they had in China. Finally, the German intervention was a conflict between people of European rather than Asian cultures. To understand whether or not Mao's five mistakes were factors in this similar yet very different intervention, one must first examine the intervention's causes and course.

Strategic Background

Hitler's intervention into Yugoslavia began in the skies over the English Channel. The failure of the air campaign against England in 1940 forced Hitler to postpone his planned invasion of England. With the possibility of directly neutralizing Britain gone, Hitler grew increasingly concerned about an Anglo-Soviet alliance forming against him. This prompted Hitler to consider invading the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Hitler believed that stability in the Balkans was a prerequisite for success in such an invasion. The Balkans represented a vulnerable flank for a move on Russia, and Germany's armies depended on the stable flow of Romanian oil.⁵⁰ Hitler made it clear that he wanted no operations that might stir up the volatile Balkan region. Unfortunately for Hitler, his allies were as unreliable as he.

Hitler went to great lengths to secure Balkan stability. Examples include his

forcing the Romanians to surrender territory to settle old boundary disputes, and his denying Mussolini's requests to expand into Yugoslavia.⁵¹ Such German involvement in the Balkans upset Mussolini because he considered the Balkans to be in Italy's sphere of influence. Mussolini was determined to demonstrate Italian dominance in the region.

Thus on 28 October 1941, Mussolini invaded Greece.⁵² Mussolini's ill-advised invasion failed. It did, however, serve to change the whole course of the war in the Balkans.

The British responded to the Italian invasion by establishing air bases on the Aegean islands of Limnos and Crete. Hitler viewed the presence of British bombers within range of the vital Romanian airfields as a serious threat. This threat convinced Hitler that he must invade and secure Greece.⁵³ The Germans started planning the invasion of Greece (Operation MARITA) in the fall of 1940. The invasion faced serious obstacles.

To invade Greece, the Germans needed to secure their LOCs through the Balkans. In some respects this was not a problem. Hungary and Romania were German allies and would cooperate fully. The Bulgarians, although not openly allied, would cooperate when the time came.⁵⁴ While this was all good, it was not enough. The problem was that there were no direct rail lines between Bulgaria and northern Greece. Without such direct rail access, the Germans could never sustain their mechanized forces so far from their logistical bases in Austria.⁵⁵ A full-scale invasion of Greece would require something the Germans did not have, Yugoslavia's cooperation.

Yugoslavia was a poor and troubled country in 1941. Yugoslavia's population was divided into three main ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians. While these groups were not in open conflict in 1941, the potential for it simmered just below the

surface. The mostly Catholic Croats lived in the northern and western regions. The Orthodox Serbs concentrated mainly in the South and East. Bosnia, in Yugoslavia's center, was inhabited by a mixture of ethnic groups, including a Muslim contingent. Yugoslavia's topography ranged from mountains in the West to wide, flat plains in the East. It was the eastern region that most interested the Germans (Map 2 at appendix B).

The only rail line that provided direct access to Greece from Austria ran through eastern Yugoslavia. The Germans needed access to that line to support Operation MARITA and to provide for the quick redeployment of forces northward for the planned invasion of Russia (Operation BARBAROSSA).⁵⁶ Desperate for access to the rail link, Hitler pressured the Yugoslavians to cooperate. The Yugoslavians resisted all through the winter. Finally in March, with the planned start of MARITA only weeks away, Hitler delivered an ultimatum. The Yugoslavian government finally caved in on 25 March.⁵⁷ This thrilled Hitler, but outraged Yugoslavia's Serbian majority. Two days later, a group of military officers conducted a bloodless coup in Belgrade and immediately reversed the decision.⁵⁸ When Hitler found out about it, he decided to intervene militarily.

Campaign Summary

Hitler's war aim in Yugoslavia was to turn the country into a stable and semi-autonomous pro-German region. This would give him control of the Belgrade-Nis-Salonika rail line he needed to invade Greece, and a stable southern flank for BARBAROSSA. Hitler's strategy to achieve his aim focused on a blitzkrieg attack designed to "destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national entity."⁵⁹

The German campaign plan for Yugoslavia was a two-phased operation. The first phase called for a three-pronged attack on Belgrade. One prong was to attack

southeastward out of Hungary to destroy enemy forces in northern Yugoslavia and prevent them from withdrawing into the western mountains. A second prong was to attack northeastward from Bulgaria to seize the vital rail line, and destroy enemy forces south of Belgrade. The third prong was to attack southwestward out of Romania to seize Belgrade and secure the Danube. The campaign's second phase centered on a drive toward Sarajevo to complete the destruction of the Yugoslavian Army.⁶⁰ The Germans were confident of success.

The German intervention started out well. The campaign opened on April 6, 1941 with an air raid that destroyed much of Belgrade and killed 17,000 people.⁶¹ The ground campaign began two days later with the attack out of Bulgaria in the South. In spite of rainy weather that slowed the German advance, by April 10 German armor had smashed through the Yugoslavian defenses and was racing toward Belgrade. By the evening of the 11th, all three prongs were within striking distance of Belgrade. Belgrade surrendered the next day without a fight.⁶² The day after Belgrade fell the Germans launched a two-pronged attack toward Sarajevo. The two armored columns lunged to the southwest smashing the disintegrating Yugoslavian Army as they went. By April 15, the Germans captured Sarajevo and the Yugoslavian government surrendered. In just twelve days of fighting, the Germans took 254,000 prisoners and eliminated all organized resistance.⁶³

The German strategy for governing defeated Yugoslavia was to divide it into a series of small territories controlled by Germany's Balkan allies. These allies included the Italians, Romanians, Bulgarians and a sadistic group of Croat fascists known as the Ustashi.⁶⁴ These German puppet regimes maintained control through brutal repression. This system worked as long as the German Army was on hand to intimidate the people. In

the long run, this repression sowed the seeds of a bitter harvest for the Germans.

The ease of his initial victory convinced Hitler that the Yugoslavians were a beaten people. He therefore quickly withdrew his first-rate combat units for use in BARBAROSSA and replaced them with a few second-rate divisions. Hitler had, however, grossly underestimated the Yugoslavians. The sudden relaxation of military pressure spawned spontaneous uprisings throughout the country.⁶⁵ The fiercely nationalistic Serbs, who suffered most at the hands of the occupiers, quickly began to organize their efforts. By the summer of 1941 the Serbs had formed an organized insurgent force called the Chetniks. After the German invasion of Russia, a second insurgent group called the Partisans emerged. The Partisans were an ethnically mixed group (except Serb) united through communist ideology. While their ethnic and political differences ultimately drove them into open conflict, these two insurgent groups initially worked together against the Germans.

In the late summer of 1941, the insurgent groups in Yugoslavia's Serbia province sparked a general uprising. The Chetniks and Partisans soon controlled two-thirds of Serbia, including the vital rail line to Greece.⁶⁶ The eruption of an organized insurgency in Serbia forced Hitler to renew offensive operations in Yugoslavia. When the garrison forces proved insufficient to quell the revolt, the Germans reinforced them with front-line units. The Germans concentrated 50,000 troops in Serbia and launched a full-scale, combined-arms attack.⁶⁷ The poorly armed insurgents crumbled before the Germans' assault. Lacking the sanctuary of extremely restrictive terrain or a friendly neighboring country to operate from, the surviving insurgents fled to Bosnia. Hitler, enraged by the revolt, ordered his forces to kill 100 Yugoslavians in reprisal for every German soldier

killed. By December, the Germans had executed over 11,000.⁶⁸ Although this policy did persuade some insurgents to quit (the Chetniks), its main effect was to generate large numbers of new insurgents.

The Germans' suppression of the revolt in Serbia formed the pattern for their counterinsurgency strategy for the next three years. The strategy focused on finding and destroying the insurgent forces in the field through conventional military means. The Germans conducted seven such campaigns throughout the war--and failed to destroy the insurgents every time.⁶⁹ In each case the Germans introduced substantial reinforcements, surrounded the insurgents and then launched a massive conventional attack. In each case the insurgents managed to escape by concentrating against one part of the encircling forces or exploiting a poorly coordinated boundary between forces. The Germans inevitably concluded their failed campaigns with a wave of reprisals that swelled the insurgents' ranks. Ultimately the insurgents grew so numerous that they were able to transition to conventional warfare and drive the Germans out of Yugoslavia. With the unfolding of the German intervention thus explained, the task now turns to analyzing the intervention in terms of Mao's five mistakes.

Piecemeal Reinforcement

The initial absence of organized Yugoslavian insurgent forces strongly affected the German performance regarding piecemeal reinforcement. In the opening phase of the intervention this absence helped the Germans avoid Mao's first mistake. Faced with a clearly defined conventional force, the Germans massed 17 divisions for their Blitzkrieg invasion and achieved a rapid and decisive tactical decision.⁷⁰ By effectively concentrating in space for one massive blow, the Germans initially avoided the needless losses and

conflict prolongation that eroded the Japanese will in China. This all changed after Hitler replaced the strong invasion force with the weak occupation force.

The German commitment of the piecemealing error coincided with the rise of the Yugoslavian insurgency. The piecemeal reinforcement began with one division in 1941 to quell the revolt in Serbia. The Germans gradually added additional units throughout the war until they had 14 divisions in theater by 1944.⁷¹ The problem was that while the Germans usually reinforced enough to drive the insurgents out of a particular stronghold, they never concentrated enough to deliver a decisive blow. The result of this failure mirrored the Japanese experience. The war dragged on, German loses mounted and German will eroded. Perhaps more importantly, the prolonged involvement in Yugoslavia tied up units that the Germans desperately needed in their struggle with the Soviets. Thus the Germans' piecemeal approach in Yugoslavia ended up having tactical, operational and strategic implications.

Absence of a Main Direction of Attack

As with the failure to concentrate in space, the German success in focusing their efforts changed over the course of their intervention. The Germans understood at the outset that the coalition government in Belgrade was Yugoslavia's COG. This was so because only that body could get the bitterly divided ethnic groups to cooperate enough to resist the Germans. The Germans therefore focused their initial invasion on that COG, smashed it, and achieved their immediate goals. They did not, however, achieve their aim.

The emergence of the resistance prevented the Germans from pacifying Yugoslavia. As with most guerrilla forces, the resistance's COG rested in the will of the people. The Germans, however, directed their efforts at smashing the insurgents in the

field. The Germans thus set themselves an impossible task. Their focus on hunting down small guerrilla bands forced the Germans to distribute their forces throughout Yugoslavia. Meanwhile the need to protect their own critical vulnerability, their tenuous LOCs, mandated that the Germans spread their forces thinner still. By failing to focus against the true Yugoslavian COG, the Germans simply wasted resources in an endless military campaign that they could never win. As in the Japanese experience, the German failure to identify the Yugoslavian COG also affected their efforts to coordinate operationally.

Lack of Operational Coordination

Unlike the Japanese, the Germans initially displayed a clear ability to concentrate their military efforts in time at the operational level. The Germans displayed this coordination in their opening offensive. The well-coordinated campaign first forced the Yugoslavians to shift forces south of Belgrade uncovering their COG. It then prevented remnants of the Yugoslavian Army from escaping to the West.⁷² It was these carefully synchronized efforts that created the Germans' astounding initial success.

In their later counterinsurgency campaigns the Germans continued to coordinate their operations, but not as successfully. The Germans were able to coordinate encirclement of the insurgents on several occasions. As was noted earlier, however, they were never able to coordinate the encircling forces closely enough to prevent the insurgents from breaking out. The area where German operational coordination finally broke down was in their efforts to deal with the civilian populace.

Like the Japanese before them, the Germans failed to coordinate the civil and military aspects of their campaign. The Germans did give some thought to civil matters. They did, for example, establish indigenous constabulary forces like the Ustashi to help

control the population. Unfortunately, the unspeakable brutality of these agencies did more to promote the resistance than to suppress it. By confining their civil efforts to repression, reprisals and brutality, the Germans solidified the will of the people against them. Obsessed with achieving a military solution, the Germans failed to coordinate the very efforts needed to achieve their aim.

Failure to Grasp Operational Opportunities

The Germans were guilty of two glaring failures to capitalize on operational opportunities in Yugoslavia. The first was their precipitous withdrawal at the end of their initial invasion. This withdrawal did two things. First, it passed the initiative firmly to the Yugoslavians. Second, it played into the emerging resistance's strategy by granting the insurgents the time and space to organize their guerrilla forces.

The other missed opportunity was the Germans' failure to exploit Yugoslavia's deep ethnic divisions. The Yugoslavian insurgent groups did not focus solely on the Germans. The Partisans and Chetnicks engaged in a veritable civil war almost from the beginning of the German intervention. The Germans' opportunity arose in 1943 when the Partisans, the more powerful insurgent group, offered the Germans a truce so that the Partisans could concentrate against the Chetnicks.⁷³ Hitler declared that "[o]ne does not negotiate with rebels" and dismissed the offer out of hand.⁷⁴ Thus Hitler passed on another golden opportunity to achieve his aim through non-military means.

Encirclement of Large, but Annihilation of Small, Numbers

Just as in the Japanese case, the German failure on this count stemmed from their reliance on a solely military solution. The Germans made this mistake from the beginning. When the coalition government surrendered in April, all organized resistance collapsed

with it. While there were some isolated guerrilla actions around the country, the vast majority of the population "...seemed apathetic toward the German occupation...".⁷⁵ It was at that moment, before the insurgency started, when an effort by the Germans to win the acceptance (or at least forbearance) of the Yugoslavian people might have strangled the insurgency in its crib. The Germans were not inclined toward such actions.

Hitler's reaction to the unrest in Yugoslavia was to crush it by force. He matched his 100 for 1 reprisals with mass deportations and the destruction of entire villages. Thus while Hitler continued to focus his efforts on destroying the fish directly, he also tried to poison the sea by making the people pay for the guerrillas' actions. Hitler never seemed to realize that when he destroyed everything the people had, including their families, he left them with nothing to lose. These hate filled people became the guerrillas' recruits.

The Germans committed all of Mao's mistakes during their failed intervention into Yugoslavia. While this second example of correlation between Mao's mistakes and ultimate failure does not prove causality, it does suggest that further study is justified. It is also interesting that the environmental differences between the two cases seem to have little impact on the results. Although factors such as the stage of internal conflict and the belligerents' culture did not effect the outcome in this case, other factors such as technology and tribalism might. To explore these possibilities, the study now considers a third intervention, the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan.

IV. Soviet Intervention into Afghanistan, December 1979

On 24 December 1979, the tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) of four Soviet motorized rifle divisions (MRD) rumbled southward across the border from the

Soviet Union into Afghanistan. The socialist regime in Kabul had lost its grip on Afghanistan, and so the Kremlin leadership had decided to intervene. Moscow envisioned a quick coup to install a more reliable socialist client government coupled with a brief occupation to stabilize the country. Given their vast firepower and technological advantages, the Soviets believed they would achieve quick success. The Soviets calculated that this intervention, patterned on their 1968 Czechoslovakian success, would take about two months. Ten years and 15,000 Soviet dead later, Afghanistan remained unpacified.⁷⁶ The Soviets' main problem was that they faced an active insurgency right from the start. The insurgents were initially hampered by deep tribal divisions. Foreign (Soviet) involvement in their internal affairs quickly served as a unifying influence on the tribal factions. These factions learned to suspend their tribal differences and work together against their common foe. It is the above mentioned technological and factional aspects of the Soviets' Afghanistan intervention that make it valuable to this analysis. In particular, the effects that technology and tribalism had on the Soviet failure. A full understanding of these effects requires a closer look at the intervention.

Strategic Background

The Soviet intervention into Afghanistan began with a violent coup in April 1978. The coup was the work of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).⁷⁷ The PDPA was an uneasy alliance of the two main communist organizations in Afghanistan, Khalq and Parcham.⁷⁸ One month after the coup, deep ideological divisions in the PDPA reached the breaking point. Khalq purged the government of Parcham members, killing them or driving them into exile. Even though they had preferred Parcham leadership, the Soviets accepted the situation and threw their support behind Khalq.⁷⁹ Little did the

Soviets realize how short lived their satisfaction over Afghanistan was to be.

It did not take long for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's (DRA) new socialist government to alienate the people of Afghanistan. The Khalq leadership saw itself as "...a Leninist vanguard, hauling a reluctant people into socialism...".⁸⁰ They immediately instituted a campaign designed to remake every facet of Afghan life in a Marxist-Leninist mold. Backed by the DRA Army, the government redistributed land, attacked traditional customs, and tried to suppress the practice of Islam. The people of Afghanistan were traditional and proud. They were also resistant to central authority, especially authority imposed by outsiders. The people quickly began to view the new Soviet-backed government as the tool of foreign infidels, and started to rebel against it. The level of violence rapidly escalated and by the summer of 1978 the Kabul regime was virtually at war with its people.

The situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate and by early 1979 twenty-five of the twenty-eight provinces were in open revolt.⁸¹ As the rebellion grew, large segments of the DRA Army defected taking their equipment with them. The situation reached a critical point in March when a powerful rebel force seized the town of Herat in western Afghanistan. The initial government forces sent to regain control defected and joined the rebels in hunting down the Soviet citizens and sympathizers in the area. This incident prompted the Soviets to increase their involvement above the military advisor level for the first time. The Kabul government dispatched a second force to Herat, this time backed by Soviet air support. This force managed to retake Herat in a bloody battle, but the event warned the Soviets that the Kabul regime was in trouble.⁸² In September, the PDPA government suffered yet another coup. This event convinced Moscow that

Afghanistan was heading rapidly towards total chaos. The Soviet leadership decided that only direct military intervention could preserve the county as a socialist entity.⁸³

Campaign Summary

Moscow's overall political aim for its military intervention was "...to establish a stable socialist government in Afghanistan, properly subservient to Soviet leadership."⁸⁴ The Soviets believed that the first steps in achieving this aim were to replace the despised government with a more moderate one while forcibly putting down the rebellion. The Soviets devised a simple two-part strategy to achieve these goals. First, they would replace the PDPA's hard-line Khalq leadership with moderate Parcham members then in exile. This would allow the PDPA to blame the old regime for all the people's grievances, and give it a fresh start in building legitimacy. Second, the Soviets would enter Afghanistan in force and secure the major LOCs and key urban centers. The idea was to intimidate the people into submission while simultaneously freeing the DRA Army from security duty. Thus unencumbered, the DRA Army would be free to crush the rebels in the countryside.⁸⁵ Unfortunately for the Soviets, they based their strategy on some bad assumptions regarding Afghanistan and its people.

Afghanistan is a poor and primitive country characterized by its rugged mountains and dry climate. The forbidding Hindu-Kush mountain range dominates the middle of the country, relegating most of the population to live in the relatively flat river valleys that fan out from the mountains and ring Afghanistan's periphery (Map 3 at Appendix C). The harsh lifestyle has made the people tough. Isolation based on the difficulty in traveling through the mountainous terrain has bred in them a deeply rooted tribal focus and disdain for central authority.⁸⁶ The Soviet strategy, designed to impose government control on a

relatively urbanized and materialistic European target like Czechoslovakia, was a bad choice in a poor, rural and semi-nomadic setting like Afghanistan. The Soviets would learn that control of the cities and infrastructure meant little to a self-sufficient people.

The first phase of the Soviet intervention went very well. The two massive armored columns that crossed the border on Christmas Eve met little resistance as they drove to secure the urban centers around Afghanistan's periphery.⁸⁷ Then on December 27, airborne forces, which the Soviets had built up at the Kabul airport, moved to seize the city. The paratroopers were aided by an elaborate deception in which Soviet military advisors had removed batteries and ammunition from DRA Army combat vehicles under the guise of "winterizing".⁸⁸ The Soviet forces in Kabul quickly overcame the Khalq security forces (killing the regime's leader in the process) and cleared the way for Moscow to install their Parcham puppet as the head of the PDPA. By the middle of January the Soviets had crushed all resistance in the city and gained control of Kabul. With the capital secure and their forces controlling the LOCs and urban centers, the Soviets launched the second phase of their intervention.⁸⁹

The second phase was decidedly unsuccessful. The DRA Army forces were unmotivated and ineffective against the rebels in the countryside. To make matters worse, large segments of this army mutinied against the puppet government and joined the rebels.⁹⁰ By the early spring the Soviets realized that they would not be able to sit back in their fortifications and watch the DRA Army fight. If they wanted to crush the rebellion, they would have to take an active role.

The new Soviet strategy centered on conventional combined-arms operations designed to destroy the rebel forces directly. The Soviets' operational method to achieve

this strategy involved a series of “sweeps” by large armored columns through rebel-held areas. The problem was that this method, based on the Soviets’ normal tactics for a high intensity war in central Europe, was completely inappropriate in the mountains of Afghanistan. In a situation reminiscent of the Japanese in China, the road-bound Soviet forces seized a series of strong points along their main LOCs but little else. This method provided the rebels an impenetrable sanctuary (the countryside) from which to mount raids of increasing boldness on the Soviets.

By the early summer of 1980, the Soviets’ strategy was clearly failing. The Soviets had increased their committed forces through the Spring to nine divisional equivalents, but their mounted sweeps had not destroyed the rebels.⁹¹ Quite the opposite, the rebels had wreaked havoc on the armored columns. This convinced the Soviets that they would not be able to defeat the rebels with a conventional strategy. With this in mind, the Soviets pulled back to their main bases to rework their strategy.

The Soviets responded to their battlefield reverses by changing their operational methods and expanding their strategic focus. They abandoned their road-bound sweeps by large armored columns. They switched instead to small pinpoint raids by attack helicopters and air mobile infantry units.⁹² With this change, the Soviets leveraged their superior technology to counter the inherent mobility advantage the rebels’ intimate knowledge of the terrain gave them. The Soviets combined these new methods with an expanded strategic focus. Rather than concentrating solely on fielded rebel forces, the Soviets began to conduct operations against the rebels’ support structure. First, the Soviets began a long-term campaign to destroy the rebels’ agricultural base. Next, the Soviets started to use air-delivered area denial munitions (mines) to drive people out of

known rebel bastion areas.⁹³ These new methods and strategy were starting to work when the two-edged sword of technology suddenly cut in the Soviets' direction.

The addition of the Stinger missile to the rebels' arsenal in 1986 forced the Soviets to again change their strategy. The Stingers had an immediate impact on Soviet airpower. In 1987 for example, the Soviets and DRA lost almost 200 aircraft to rebel Stingers.⁹⁴ Under the protective umbrella of the Stingers, Afghan farmers returned home and began to grow food. The Soviets responded to the Stinger threat by switching from air to artillery based operations. They also resurrected their use of armored columns (although much smaller) to keep their LOCs open. The Soviets paired these new methods with new strategic objectives. While they never dropped direct actions against rebel forces, they did place special emphasis on interdicting the rebel LOCs.⁹⁵ The Soviets felt that if they could cut the rebel supply lines from Iran and Pakistan, they could stop the flow of Stingers and other high-technology weapons. The Soviets also started to shift the burden of the war's prosecution onto the PDPA. By 1987, public opinion in the Soviet Union was running against the seemingly interminable war. Additionally, the Soviets' strategy of winning legitimacy for their puppet regime through economic and political efforts was foundering. No matter what improvements they introduced, the Soviets could not overcome the antipathy the Afghans felt toward outsiders. Unable to stop the flow of weapons and unwilling to make the massive commitment required to destroy all resistance, the Soviets began to seek a negotiated settlement. In April 1988, the Soviets signed the Geneva Peace Accords and agreed to pull out within nine months.⁹⁶ Thus, despite their overwhelming military superiority and temporary success, the Soviets' intervention ultimately failed. As in the Japanese and German cases, Mao's five mistakes offer insight

into the Soviet failure.

Piecemeal Reinforcement

The Soviets, like their Japanese and German counterparts before them, were guilty of applying force to Afghanistan in a piecemeal fashion. This mistake was the natural result of the Soviets' original strategy. Because they had planned to have the DRA Army pacify the countryside while they secured the LOCs and urban centers, the Soviets purposely entered Afghanistan in less than overwhelming force. Thus as the DRA Army gradually proved itself unequal to its task, the Soviets had to bring in reinforcements to support their steadily expanding role in the fighting.

The Soviets' piecemeal reinforcement produced the traditional results. By failing to concentrate in space, the Soviets subjected themselves to unnecessary losses and prolonged the war. While these results gradually eroded the Soviet Army's morale, they also produced a more important effect back in the Soviet Union. There the war worked to sap the Soviet people's desire to continue the fight.⁹⁷ The gradual loss of the Soviet public's will ultimately forced the Soviet leadership to the bargaining table. Thus by failing to concentrate in space, the Soviets created conditions in which the political cost of continuing the fight outweighed the political benefits of possible victory.

Absence of a Main Direction of Attack

In contrast to their failure to concentrate in space, the Soviets did a credible job of focusing their efforts. Their initial operational concept featured dedicating the DRA Army to destroying the resistance in the field. When the DRA Army failed, the Soviets "...carried the war to the resistance..." themselves.⁹⁸ When direct attacks against the resistance failed, the Soviets expanded their efforts to include actions against the

insurgents' critical vulnerabilities. The Soviets' campaigns against Afghan agriculture and villages were clear attempts to eliminate the rebels' support structure. Thus the Soviets' actions revealed that they recognized the Afghan will to resist as the Afghan COG, and that they focused their efforts against it. The Soviets' failure to achieve their aim despite avoiding Mao's second mistake therefore had other sources. Their piecemeal use of force was one such source. Their failure to coordinate the efforts they did make against the Afghan COG was another.

Lack of Operational Coordination

The Soviets' failure to coordinate their operations had two major components. The first was their failure to concentrate in time militarily against the resistance forces. Limited by their lack of forces, the highly compartmented Afghan terrain and the rebels' much greater mobility in that terrain, the Soviets could not initially exert continuous synchronized pressure on the rebels. The best that the Soviets could manage was a disjointed series of sweeps through the various inhabited valleys. The result was that the insurgents simply melted away into the mountains to avoid the Soviets, only to filter back when the Soviets departed. The Soviets managed to correct this problem temporarily by applying their superior technology. By reversing the rebels' mobility advantage with their helicopter units, the Soviets developed the ability to conduct well-coordinated operations against the resistance strongholds. The effects were immediate and Afghan resistance dropped markedly. When the Stingers neutralized the Soviets' technological advantage, the Soviets reverted to making Mao's third mistake. This limitation, more than any other single factor, doomed the Soviets' ability to win their aim militarily.

The second component of the Soviets' lack of operational coordination was their

failure to synchronize their civil efforts with their military ones. While still a failure, the Soviet experience in this area is much different from the other two cases. This is because while the Japanese and Germans did nothing to neutralize the civilian populace through non-military means, the Soviets did. The Soviets' work to build legitimacy for their client government was a clear effort to pacify the Afghans by political and economic methods. The Soviets' problem was that these efforts clashed with what the Soviets were doing militarily. Any positive effects the Soviets achieved through economic largess withered when overlaid with the campaign of destruction they conducted in the countryside. Thus rather than achieving synergies by coordinating their civil and military campaigns, the Soviets effectively undermined their own efforts.⁹⁹ The Soviets' failure to coordinate their civil and military efforts was the single greatest factor in their overall failure.

Failure to Grasp Operational Opportunities

The Soviets missed two major opportunities to attack their opponents' strategy in Afghanistan. The first occurred during the initial chaotic weeks of the Soviet intervention. During that tumultuous period, the DRA Army split with some units remaining loyal the new PDPA government while others joined the rebellion against it. The Soviets, fixated on securing the urban centers, failed to pursue and destroy these units.¹⁰⁰ They thus repeated the Japanese mistake of failing to destroy the soldiers who would become the cadre and backbone of the resistance.

The Soviets' second missed opportunity was their failure to exploit the various tribal factions' traditional distrust and antagonism. The Afghan resistance was never a well-coordinated affair. As hostile to other tribal factions as to the Soviets, the resistance was "... not an army but a people in arms."¹⁰¹ It is incredible that in such a divided

environment the Soviets could not co-opt some tribal factions to work against others. Such a failure was either a horrific Soviet mistake, or a tribute to the Afghans' cultural and religious fidelity. In either event it represented a missed opportunity to attack the rebels' strategy. This was because in not co-opting the regional tribal factions, the Soviets failed to close vast stretches of the rebels' countryside sanctuary.

Encirclement of Large, but Annihilation of Small, Numbers

As with the Japanese and Germans before them, the Soviets committed Mao's fifth mistake by failing to adopt a strategy capable of reaching a decision. This occurred because like their earlier counterparts, the Soviets relied primarily on military means. Though the Soviets did pursue some non-military means as discussed earlier, the bulk of their efforts went to smashing the rebels through force.

The Soviets' military efforts initially paralleled the Germans' Yugoslavia experience. The Soviets began by trying to kill the fish directly. The Soviet response to this failure differed from the Germans. Rather than trying to poison the sea against the fish, the Soviets tried to drain it. The Soviets designed their anti-agriculture and depopulation campaigns to turn Afghanistan's countryside into a vacant wasteland. The vigor with which the Soviets worked to empty Afghanistan was evident in the number of people the Soviets' programs displaced. The war created seven and a half million refugees, a total that represented over a third of the pre-war population.¹⁰² The only civil affairs program that could have achieved the Soviets' war aim under those circumstances would have been the extermination of the Afghan tribes. The lack of an effective operational decision mechanism, doomed the Soviet intervention to the failure it produced.

The three interventions this paper presented span a wide spectrum of operational

and environmental factors. These factors include a range of ideologies, cultures, levels of internal division and technology, to name a few. Despite these differences, Mao's five failures played a critical role in all three of the interventionists' failures to achieve their war aims. The obvious question for this paper thus becomes what lessons does this result reveal for US planners? The following section explores this question.

V. Implications for US Planners

At first glance, Mao's list of five mistakes seem rather unremarkable as sources of planning guidance. On the surface, his warnings that one must avoid piecemeal reinforcement, pick a main direction of attack, coordinate one's actions, take advantage of opportunities and destroy one's foe seem very like the principles of mass, objective, economy of force, surprise and offensive.¹⁰³ Considered at the tactical level, this assessment is accurate. At the operational level, his observations are much more insightful.

This analysis has focused on the operational level, within the framework of military intervention into a politically unstable environment. When viewed in this context, Mao's five mistakes yield three major themes. The first is the need to correctly identify the enemy's strategic COG. The second is the importance of synchronizing efforts so that military and civil actions support each other. The third is the need to focus on a decisive and acceptable endstate rather than on favorable military outcomes. The following discussion considers these themes in detail.

In its section on centers of gravity, Joint Pub (JP) 3-0 states that "[t]he essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in

order to neutralize them.”¹⁰⁴ This statement subsumes Mao’s first two observations with its emphasis on the criticality of mass and of focusing that mass. More importantly, the statement supports Mao’s first theme by emphasizing the vital purpose behind proper identification of the COGs.

The paper’s three example interventions also provided compelling evidence in support of the first theme. The Japanese completely misunderstood the true nature of the Chinese COG in 1937. As a result they focused on the conventional Chinese Army and thus made no efforts to neutralize the real source of Chinese power. The Germans did a better job in Yugoslavia. Not only did they correctly identify the Yugoslavian COG, they successfully tracked the COG as it changed over time. The Germans’ problem was that even though they recognized the insurgents’ will to resist as the new COG, they did not recognize that it was too diffuse and elusive to smash through direct action. Had the Germans understood the COG’s intractability they could have shifted their efforts to neutralizing the COG’s critical vulnerability: the guerrillas’ popular support. The Soviets came the closest to getting it right. They recognized the COG and went after it. When it proved too diffuse to smash, the Soviets shifted their emphasis to destroying the guerrillas’ base of popular support. The Soviets’ problem was the method they used. They chose to pursue a military solution and thereby galvanized rather than neutralized the guerrillas’ popular support. In all three cases, the interventionists’ failure to fully understand their foe’s COG prevented them from acting appropriately.

The analysis of the first theme yields three practical considerations for US planners of military interventions. First, understanding the enemy COG is the foundation of successful planning. Second, the enemy COG can change over time, and one must

monitor that change. Third, the COG is often too diffuse to attack directly in insurgency situations. In such cases, one must focus on the COG's critical vulnerability: the insurgency's popular support. This last point ties directly to the next major theme.

The three examples highlighted the importance of synchronizing the military and civil efforts during an intervention. The Japanese failed to coordinate their military actions at the operational level in China. They also failed to conduct, let alone coordinate, efforts to pacify the Chinese populace. As a result they enjoyed none of the positive, synergistic effects of synchronized actions discussed in JP 3-0.¹⁰⁵ The Germans and the Soviets, on the other hand, did a credible job of operational coordination in their interventions. These synchronized efforts yielded the kinds of impressive tactical successes that the Japanese could not achieve. The Germans and Soviets, however, both failed to coordinate these military triumphs with constructive civil efforts. The Germans' brutal civil policies, based on reprisals, worked to amplify rather than suppress the insurgents' will and intensified popular support. Similarly, the Soviets' scorched earth and depopulation policies produced negative synergies which drove the Soviets from rather than toward their aim of a stable and friendly border region. Current doctrine supports the three historical examples regarding the importance of synchronizing an intervention's military and civil efforts.

US Army Filed Manual (FM) 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, lists political dominance as the first imperative of success in a low intensity conflict (LIC). The imperative states that in the LIC environment, political objectives "...drive military decisions at every level--from strategic to tactical."¹⁰⁶ Civil affairs are a vital, even dominant, component of political discourse in both war and peace. Thus given the

doctrine's focus on the political aspects of LIC, it is easy to see the need for coordinating one's military and civil efforts. Only synchronized and mutually supportive civil and military actions can produce the effects needed to achieve positive political results.

Considering the above discussion, the second theme yields two additional considerations for US planners. First, political considerations are a fundamental part of planning for a military intervention. Next, civil affairs play a dominant role in political outcomes, and so one must carefully synchronize civil and military efforts to achieve positive results. The desire for positive results is related to the final theme.

Mao's third theme, which focuses on the need to achieve a decisive and acceptable decision, is an integral part of current doctrine. JP 3-0's assertion that "[w]ars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure" demonstrates the vital nature of this theme.¹⁰⁷ What this means to planners, in practical terms, is that they must judge every action they plan in terms of its contribution to the desired endstate. The Japanese, Germans and Soviets all missed this important consideration. Their lack of effective civil efforts, excessive brutality and short-term focus demonstrated that their planning centered on battlefield victory rather than the desired endstate. Thus the interventionists' misguided planning proved to be the proximate cause of their failure to achieve their war aims.

Another factor in reaching an acceptable decision is a clear understanding of the operational environment's nature. JP 3-0 claims that "[t]he underlying causes of a particular war--such as cultural, religious, [or] territorial--must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for [conflict] termination..."¹⁰⁸ All three interventionists failed on this point by focusing their efforts on a military solution. They

thus missed opportunities to tailor their plans to exploit their foes' political, ethnic and tribal divisions. The practical consideration here is that planners must make special efforts to understand the operational context in military intervention, and then make that understanding an integral factor in their planning process. Only in this way can they ensure that the military campaign they plan takes advantage of environmental factors without undermining the strategic aim.

The above discussion confirms the value of Mao's five observations. The five specific mistakes that Mao identified as the cause of Japanese failure translated into three broad themes at the operational level. These themes in turn yielded seven practical considerations for US planners of interventions into politically divided regions. Such practical guidance, originating as it did from the insurgent's perspective, is a valuable planning asset.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has focused on examining the problem of intervention from the enemy's perspective. It did this by using Mao Tse-Tung's five mistakes as the basis of its analysis. By taking Mao, the master insurgent, as a guide, the paper focused on the interventionists' shortcomings from the insurgent's point of view. The benefit of looking at the world through the enemy's lens is the possibility of more fully satisfying the second half of Sun Tzu's instruction to "know your enemy and know yourself..."¹⁰⁹ An analysis based on Mao's five observations, therefore, holds the potential for producing valuable planning guidance if Mao's observations are generally applicable rather than specific to the Japanese case.

The paper demonstrated that Mao's set of five observations is a valuable source of planning guidance. The observations are applicable across a wide range of geographic, cultural, political and ethnic factors, and provide important insights into the failure of military interventions. The paper presented these insights as a set of three operational 'themes' instrumental to success in a military intervention. The themes are: the need to correctly identify the enemy COG; the importance of synchronizing civil and military efforts; and the need to focus on achieving a decisive and acceptable outcome.

The set of themes serves two purposes. First, the 'themes' are the source of seven practical planning considerations. These considerations are not a set of principles for intervention or a rigid checklist for successful planning. They are simply a series of factors that, from the insurgents' perspective, proved instrumental to the three interventionists' ultimate failure. Thus they represent guidance that could help US planners when planning intervention operations. Second, the 'themes' confirm the validity of current LIC doctrine. The need to identify the correct COG reflects the LIC imperative of political dominance. The importance of synchronized civil and military efforts reflects the LIC imperatives of unity of effort and adaptability. The need to focus on the endstate reflects the LIC imperatives of legitimacy and perseverance.¹¹⁰

Intervention into unstable and divided regions of the world is the future of the US Army. The Panama, Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia operations were all examples of interventions into hostile or unstable environments with the potential for both conventional and unconventional conflict. Assuming that these operations were examples of what will become the future operational norm, it makes sense to study the historical record on intervention. It is particularly useful to examine interventions by modernized and

professional armies into divided and economically underdeveloped environments since that is the context within which the US Army will likely operate.

¹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.

² Frank Dorn, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 62.

³ Ibid., 62.

⁴ Ibid., 63.

⁵ Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 206.

⁶ Ibid., 252.

⁷ Ibid., 20.

⁸ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 16.

⁹ Ibid., 19-20.

¹⁰ Ibid., 12.

¹¹ Ibid., 21-24.

¹² Li, Lincoln, The Japanese Army in North China 1937-1941, (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 22.

¹³ The World Book Encyclopedia, 1992 ed., s.v. "China."

¹⁴ Tse-Tung, Mao, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 193.

¹⁵ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 34.

¹⁶ Ibid., 37.

¹⁷ Ibid., 36-37.

¹⁸ Li, Lincoln, The Japanese Army in North China 1937-1941, (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 4.

¹⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 611.

²⁰ Li, Lincoln, The Japanese Army in North China 1937-1941, (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 6.

²¹ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 34.

²² Ibid., 67-102.

²³ Ibid., 79.

²⁴ Although Mao called these strategic mistakes, he was really writing about the level of war we now consider the operational level. I have followed the modern convention in this paper.

²⁵ Tse-Tung, Mao, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 252.

²⁶ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 5

²⁷ This figure is an estimate based on summing the forces engaged around China. Ibid., 67-97.

²⁸ Tse-Tung, Mao, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 252.

²⁹ Ibid., 250.

³⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 204.

³¹ Ibid., 193.

³² Ibid., 252.

³³ Ibid., 97.

³⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 495.

³⁵ Ibid., 495.

³⁶ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 67.

³⁷ Li, Lincoln, The Japanese Army in North China 1937-1941, (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 4.

³⁸ The three rail lines the Japanese columns followed diverged by more than 100 miles while Shanghai was over 300 miles away to the south. Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 104.

³⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 209.

⁴⁰ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 146-157.

⁴¹ Tse-Tung, Mao, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 253.

⁴² Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 45, 114.

⁴³ Tse-Tung, Mao, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 193.

⁴⁴ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

⁴⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 611., 99.

⁴⁶ Li, Lincoln, The Japanese Army in North China 1937-1941, (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975), 187.

⁴⁷ Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, tr. Samuel B. Griffith, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 8.

⁴⁸ Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor. (New York: MacMillan Publishing CO., 1974), 47.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 2-3.

⁵⁰ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978) 17.

⁵¹ Center of Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaign in the Balkans. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 3.

⁵² Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 17.

⁵³ Center of Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaign in the Balkans. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 9.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁷ Constantin Fotitch, The War We Lost: Yugoslavia's Tragedy and the Failure of the West. (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), 64.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 75.

⁵⁹ Center of Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaign in the Balkans. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 25.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 50-52.

⁶¹ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 26

⁶² Center of Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaign in the Balkans. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 54.

⁶³ Ibid., 64.

⁶⁴ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 84

⁶⁵ Paul N. Hehn, The German Struggle against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), 4.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 28-31.

⁶⁷ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 80.

⁶⁸ Paul N. Hehn, The German Struggle against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), 69.

⁶⁹ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 102.

⁷⁰ Center of Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaign in the Balkans. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 36-37.

⁷¹ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 119.

⁷² Center of Military History Publication 104-4, The German Campaign in the Balkans. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984), 50-55.

⁷³ Ibid., 127.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 129.

⁷⁵ Ronald H Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), 92.

⁷⁶ Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War, (London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD., 1995), 224.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁸ David, C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989), 16.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., 21.

⁸³ Scott, R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey's, 1991), 4.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁵ David, C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989), 24.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁷ Scott, R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey's, 1991), 10.

⁸⁸ M. S. Caren, "The Soviet-Afghan War: Another Look," (Final Report, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1994, DTIC: AD-A283-433), 12.

⁸⁹ David, C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989), 24.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 24.

⁹¹ Scott, R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan, (London: Brassey's, 1991), 12.

⁹² Robert F. Bauman, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 152.

⁹³ David, C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989), 28.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 44.

⁹⁵ Robert F. Bauman, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 136

⁹⁶ David, C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989), 45.

⁹⁷ Robert F. Bauman, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 174.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 136.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 170.

¹⁰⁰ David, C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance, (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1989), 24.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 92.

¹⁰² Robert Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 11.

¹⁰³ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1993), 2-4 & 2-5.

¹⁰⁴ Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Baltimore, US Army AG Publications Center), III-20.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., III-10.

¹⁰⁶ Field Manual 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1993), 1-2.


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¹⁰⁸ Ibid., III-22.


¹⁰⁹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.


¹¹⁰ Field Manual 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 1993), 1-2

Map 1 - Northeast China, 1937



Map 2 - Yugoslavia, 1941





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